Reporting Agent for Linux security design

How the DataReel Reporting Agent for Linux protects a fleet inventory: an RSA key per host, certificate registration and approval, signed uploads with timestamps and one-time nonces, TLS 1.2 or later with hybrid post-quantum key exchange, the two RHEL 8 packages and the crypto policy, the report server checks, the protections on the host, quantum computing and the limits.

The current copy is at https://datareel.com/linux_reporting_agent/security_design.php.

Release: 1.1.3, with the report server pages of the same release. Audience: security reviewers, administrators and anyone deciding whether to run the agent on their hosts or trust the reports it sends. The source code is published, so everything on this page can be checked against it; the design does not depend on keeping it secret. The documentation has the setup steps, and the RPMs are on the downloads page.

1. What the agent protects, and from whom

The agent is a systemd service for RHEL 8, 9 and 10 that collects a report about its host (release, kernel, hardware, IP addresses, usage, logged in users, SELinux, firewall and SSH settings, failed services, pending updates, installed packages and, after a scan, the Red Hat security advisories the host still needs) and sends it as a text report to a report server, a CIFS share or an SSH server. The goals are:

The agent does not protect against someone who is root on a host (they can make it send any report they like or copy its key), against an attacker who controls the report server, or against a site that runs the server over plain HTTP. It reports what the host tells it; it is an inventory, not an intrusion detection system.

2. The parts and how they trust each other

Linux host (RHEL 8, 9, 10) Agent key, RSA 3072/var/lib/drra, root only, mode 0600 drra.service (hardened unit) /etc/drra, /var/lib/drraroot only Report server (Apache + PHP) register.php, upload.php,hook.php: open, signed admin.php: loginvex_index.php: open, read only DATA_DIRregistrations, nonces, reports CIFS share orSSH servernot signed DRSMreads report files,never connects to hosts HTTPS, signed CIFS or SCP Every connection starts at the host. The service listens on no port. Dashed: DRSM reads the reports folder, or a share on the monitor host.
Figure 1. The agent, the report server and DRSM. Only the HTTPS path is signed.
PartTrustsIs trusted for
Agent service (root)The host (rpm, dnf, /proc, systemd, SELinux, firewalld), the settings file, the server's TLS certificate as OpenSSL checks it against the system trust store or ca_fileReporting what the host tells it about itself
register.php, upload.php, hook.phpNothing in a request until its signature, approval state, time and nonce are checkedKeeping only approved, signed, fresh reports
admin.phpThe web server login, or the DRSM dashboard loginApproving hosts and showing their registrations to signed-in people
DRSMThe report files in its reports folderAlerts, the dashboard, trends and the Vulnerabilities page

3. The host's identity

4. Registration and approval

Agent signs"register" | host | time | nonce |SHA-256(certificate)sends cert + token + signature register.php checkshost name, nonce, time window,CN = host, signature, nonce unused(proof the agent holds the key) Known host, same keyreply: its state (no change) Known host, other keykey_mismatch until an admin deletes it New hostpending, or approved by the token admin.php: Approveafter the fingerprint check The agent saves "approved <fingerprint> <server>" and registers again when the key or the server changes, or when the server answers not_registered, pending, revoked or key_mismatch.
Figure 2. A host name is bound to the first key that registers it.

5. Signed uploads

1. Formathost name, nonce 2. Timewithin 300 s 3. Approvedregistered, not revoked 4. Size2 MB by default 5. Signatureregistered certificate 6. Noncenever seen before 7. Saveunder the signer's name Any failureSTATUS: bad_timestamp, not_registered, pending, revoked, bad_signature, replay ... Signed data: "upload" | host | time | nonce | SHA-256 of the report (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, SHA-256)
Figure 3. A report is saved only after every check passes.

6. Transport and delivery methods

7. On the Linux host

8. On the report server

9. Cryptography and FIPS

UseAlgorithmDone by
Host identityRSA 3072, key file root onlyOpenSSL on the host
Request signaturesRSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256OpenSSL on the host, PHP OpenSSL on the server
Report and certificate hashes, fingerprintSHA-256OpenSSL, PHP
Nonces128 random bitsOpenSSL RAND_bytes
TransportTLS 1.2 or 1.3; key exchange in section 12libcurl and OpenSSL (section 6), Apache

The agent is not a validated cryptographic module and makes no FIPS claim of its own. Its cryptography is done by OpenSSL and, on the server, by PHP's OpenSSL extension:

10. What a report holds

A report names the host, its serial number, IP addresses, logged in users, every installed package and version, pending updates, SELinux, firewall and SSH settings, failed services and, after a scan, the security advisories and CVEs still to fix. Together the reports are a map of the fleet and its weak spots, so treat the reports folder like any other sensitive inventory: keep the pages that show it behind a login, keep backups private, and give DRSM and other readers access only to what they need. The agent sends no passwords and no file contents beyond what report hooks and hook uploads are set up to send.

11. Limits, stated plainly

12. Quantum computing

A large quantum computer, if one is built, could break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. For this agent that matters in two places:

Hybrid post-quantum key exchange. Release 1.1.3 can use the hybrid TLS group X25519MLKEM768: ML-KEM-768 (NIST FIPS 203) combined with X25519, so the connection key stays secret as long as either of the two holds. The group is used only when both the agent and the report server offer it; otherwise TLS falls back to a classical group (X25519 or P-256) and the connection still works. What each build offers, as tested on 11/18/2026 against a server that offers the hybrid group:

BuildOffersKey exchange in the test
RHEL 8 linux_reporting_agent-openssl35X25519MLKEM768 first, then the classical groups (OpenSSL 3.5 defaults under the crypto policy)X25519MLKEM768
RHEL 8 linux_reporting_agentRHEL 8's OpenSSL 1.1.1 has no ML-KEM; classical groups of the crypto policyX25519 (FIPS mode: P-256)
RHEL 9 (9.8, OpenSSL 3.5.8)The DEFAULT crypto policy does not offer ML-KEM. With [https] tls_groups=X25519MLKEM768:X25519:P-256 it does.x25519 by default; X25519MLKEM768 with that setting
RHEL 10 (10.2, OpenSSL 3.5.8)The DEFAULT crypto policy offers ML-KEM firstX25519MLKEM768

RHEL 9 and 10 hosts in FIPS mode follow Red Hat's FIPS provider and FIPS policy; check the group with drra selftest https://<your server>/ on such a host. The TLS: line in drra.log shows the group of every upload.

The report server decides too. A web server that does not offer the hybrid group gets a classical key exchange from every agent. For hybrid key exchange the server's TLS library needs ML-KEM (OpenSSL 3.5 or later) and a group list that includes it (for example Apache with SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Groups X25519MLKEM768:X25519:secp256r1, where supported). The datareel.com hosted report server does not offer the hybrid group yet, so connections to it use X25519 until the server supports ML-KEM; no agent change is needed when it does.

13. AI-assisted use

The AI-assisted guide (AGENTS.md) keeps an AI agent away from every secret on this page: it never reads the enrollment token, the agent's private key, a share login, an SCP key, server.ini or the admin passwords, never suggests copying the key, weakening a check, turning FIPS mode on or off or running the openssl35 package in FIPS mode, and never approves a host without the fingerprint check. People run or approve every step.

14. Reporting a security issue

Report security issues privately through the contact page, not in public issue trackers. Fixes go into the next release; the change log lists every release and what changed.